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IS MAN A MECHANISM ?
BY EDWARD O. SISSON
WHEN a hypothesis succeeds, it tends gradually to take on the
aspect of absolute truth ; men forget that it is a hypothesis at
all and proceed as if it were a proven item of knowledge. This is
what has happened widely in the case of the mechanistic-deter-
ministic theory of the universe. This hypothesis may well be con-
sidered the most successful single movement in the whole history of
thinking: it is the central principle of modern science, and the
science which has been built upon it is lord of the thought and action
of the present age. Xo wonder that the hypothesis itself has
mastered the minds of men and become the very image of the divine
in the realm of the intellect. To question its ultimate validity has
become almost a sign of mental weakness, upon which the seeming-
superior intelligence of the mechanist looks down with pity or con-
tempt. Its final triumph is embodied in the designation of man
himself as a mechanism : from La Mettrie's "L'Homme machine"
to the present day, this doctrine has grown and spread until it per-
vades not only biology and ps\chology, but also sociology (in the
broadest sense) and ethics.
It should be clear that the supreme duty of the philosopher is to
question this sweeping conclusion. Never was Socratic scepticism
more demanded by the situation. All the forces of intellectual
fashion and etiquette,—as powerful in the life of reflective
thought as elsewhere,—are on the side of the mechanistic interpre-
tation. IF the final metaphysical dictvim of mechanism is not true,
then the present state of opinion concerning man and the miiverse
is the supreme example in history of the facilis descensus Averni;
its consequences might well be as terrible as Romanes apprehended
them fifty years ago when he wrote
:
"Never in the history of man has so terrific a calamity be-
fallen the race as that which all who look may now behold
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advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless
in might, uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulphing
our most precious creed, and burying our highest life in
mindless destruction."^
My own first proposition is that the metaphysical theory of mechan-
ism is totally unproven, and that philosophy has no more urgent duty
than to push to the furthest limits a criticism of the grounds of the
theory. This is a logical undertaking of the first order, as we shall
see at the outset of the inquiry itself.
Nothing could be more unwise and impractical than to under-
estimate or in any way depreciate the truth involved in the mechan-
istic theory. The first obligation, and the primary qualification, of
the opponent of metaphysical mechanism is to be possessed of a
reasonable comprehension of the gigantic success and validity of
scientific mechanism, warm and a sincere appreciation of its bene-
ficient achievements. Inestimable damage has been wrought to the
cause of a non-mechanistic view of the universe by quasi-religious
pleas which blindly attack the solid and admirable achievements of
science : this is too familiar a spectacle as to need no extended treat-
ment ; the anti-evolution movement is perhaps the best example. But
it is so far out on the obscurantist wing as to be of little service in
orientation for us. Any sincere and hopeful attack upon meta-
physical mechanism must put a whole world between its view of
science and that of the typical anti-evolutionists.
More to us is the case of highly intelligent and critical minds
oppressed by the same type of fears as Romanes, who have lamented
rather than challenged the ravages of mechanism and have been led
by their grief into false views of the beneficient results of mchanistic
science. Of this type Krutsch's "Modern Temper" is a notable and
brilliant example. We cannot believe that lyric utterances of this
nature can avail anything in the needed inquiry.
1. Terms and Concepts Involved
We must first invite the mechanist to join in a careful, logical
scrutiny of the terms and concepts involved in the problem. These
are in the main two: machine and mechanism. Behind these Eng-
lish words are of course two classic terms, Greek mechane and
Latin machina; the Latin machina we may pass over as practically
equivalent to English machine. But the Greek mechane, the oldest
1 Candid Examination of Theism, 1787, p. 51. Also quoted in Danvin and
Modern Science^ Cambridge University Press, 1909
; p. 486.
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of the set, carries, as we might expect, a deeply different sense, at
last from our English derivatives, not only machine, but also
mechanism and mechanical, etc. That is, mechane signifies any
means or device by which a desired end can be achieved ; it is hardly
more than a way or manner of doing something. Thus it has a
breadth and looseness of application far different from the hard and
fast limitation of the English terms machine and, in its primary
sense, mechanism. This is of vital importance in understanding the
processes of thought in this field. The common idea in mechane
and machine is that of purpose. But the purpose, of course,
is not in the mechane or the machine : it is in the maker
and user of these things. So that while mechane and machine both
imply purpose, it is not their own purpose, but the purpose of the
maker. That they both connote, inexorably. No purpose, no
mechane, no machine. Both are devised to achieve and end; and
such devising takes place only in what we call minds ; to talk of
devising means to end and in the same breath to deny mind is to
talk nonsense. This is a logical crux and the discussion must hold
to it. It is useless for us to talk with each other unless we are
willing to mean something by our words, and to keep on meaning
the same until we give fair warning of change. There are too many
Humpty-Dumpty's to whom "a word means just what I want it to
mean, no more and no less." When we say mechane, with Greeks,
or machine with our own speech, we must mean purpose. Note
that I have not said that the English word mechanism implies pur-
pose. The biologist has borrowed the term to describe the operating
structures of living beings, especially skeletal and muscular struc-
tures for locomotion and other movements. Biological discussion had
to have a term for these structures, and it got its term in the com-
monest way, by adapting from the Greek. But between the time
when the Greeks were still using mechane in their own sense and the
time when the biologist adopted,—and adapted,—the term to his use,
the machine had swum into the region of reflective thought, and the
term mechanism was all infected with a non-Greek conception of
machine. So biological "mechanism," which would have been a
simple and innocent word to the Greeks from whom the form was
borrowed, now carries a sense of machinery, of cog wheels, crank-
shafts, pinions, steel, iron, brass, and so on ad lib., a hard, "mechan-
ical" feeling, quite remote from and hostile to thought and purpose.
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Nothing of this sort would have been felt by a Greek accustomed to
the rather genial and free word mechane.
Thus we come by a perfectly proper linguistic process to possess
the word iiiechainsDi,—with the usual set of derivatives,—which is
sharply different in meaning from its original, and also from the
Latin parallel term machina; in that these terms both imply purpose
in the maker of deviser, and the new English term explicitly does
not imply purpose, is indifferent to purpose, and indeed, as time
goes on, tends to be hostile to purpose. Yet at the same time all
these new "mechane"" terms still bear the fragrance of the old
Greek uicchanc, and can avail themselves at need of the breadth and
freedom of that old term. Such is the subtlety and elusiveness of
language : and no inquiry into processes of thought can evade or
safely deny these elusive aspects of the meanings of terms, for they
presently turn out to have rigidly logical consequences. This is
eminently true in the present great debate on the mechanistic inter-
pretation of the world and Man.
We repeat then, that the common idea of mechane and machine
is purpose in the mind of a maker ; and that the modern terms
mechanical, meachanism, mechanistic, etc., have sloughed off this
idea of purpose, and retained simply an idea of operativeness or
efficacy. Let us now take the next step in this simple logic of
meanings : that is to see that Greek mechane and English machine
differ sharply in an important aspect of their meaning, and one
which concerns us materially : whereas mechane is any sort of means
or device, if only adapted to the end and adopted for the end,
—
machine strictly means something put together of parts. This is
certainly not true of the Greek original ; probably not of the Latin
form ; indeed, it is quite possible that in earlier English use the
word machine might sometimes mean something quite simple,
what we call a tool, for example. But in modern use the term
machine rigorously implies complexity, and complexity due to the
conjoining of parts, and of parts which work together to accomplish
the desired end.
2. Man-made Machines and Natural Mechanisms.
The modern world is chock full of machines in this sense,—all
the way from an egg-beater to a Hoe cylinder press, a Wright
whirlwind engine, or a radio-compass. Whoever says machine or
mechanical today is talking about all these things : he may not mean
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them directly, but when his word strikes the ear-drum of his hstener
and reverberates in his association areas, the dim form of all these
steel and brass contraptions loom in the fringe of his consciousness
;
certainly they are operative in his "thinking," or else all modern
psychology is mad. And a logic which ignores psychology is no
logic at all, but only pompous Humpty-Dumptyism. When I use a
word it means what my hearer thinks in response to it, no more
and no less : and if I say machine or mechanical to a twentieth
century civilized man, these words inevitably make him think of
Ford cars, typewriters, diamond drills, oil derricks, and so on ad
libitum. This is part of the rigorous logic of machine and mechan-
ical, and must be recognized by those who use the terms.
It is clear that this put-togetherness of the machine brings in
the maker and his purpose in full strength : the machine does not
put itself together: on the contrary the leading business of civilized
man today is making parts of machines and "assembling" them into
machines. Ford himself is the mighty Maker of all the millions of
cars that bear his magic name ; under him swarms a vast hierarch\'
of lesser makers, some with much mind, whom we call engineers,
some with less mind, called mechanics, and others who need no mind,
but only bodies, called laborers. And as is Ford so are the AIc-
Cormicks, the Edisons, and the other great ]\Iachine-]\Iakers. At
the other end, as soon as the Makers have perfected their task and
the machines stand ready in serried rowed (or any other convenient
array!), the millions of users seize them and rush about in the mani-
fold activities made possible by these modern miracles. Such is the
Modern Machine Age, and poor is the intelligence that does not
sense it in some degree : and it is this Age whose ghost is raised
whenever the words machine and mechanical are offered and ac-
cepted in intellectual traffic.
But in all this maze of purpose and achievement, the machine
itself is purposeless : it neither thinks nor feels ; the machine age
is the fruit of infinite purpose and intelligence, in a double sense
:
first it is purpose and intelligence that generate the machines, and
then the machines open the way for the further expansion of pur-
pose and intelligence. But the machine is without purpose and
without intelligence ; so much so that machine-like or mechanical
naturally become the terms to denote activity complex enough to
suggest purpose and Intelligence, but in itself devoid of both. That
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is the sting of a philosophical mechanism, that it implies even if it
does not always assert, that man himself, being a mechanism and
part and parcel of a mechanistic universe, is also devoid of purpose
;
or at best that his supposed purpose is but an epiphenomenon
lacking all force and validity,—an illusion stretching like an im-
material veil over the hard realities of the cosmic machine.
]\Iark now the confusion which issues from the two sharply
divers denotations of these terms : on the one hand we have the
simple machine with which any child is more or less familiar, made
by man, used by man for man's purposes. Never before has this
fact bulked so large as now : as already pointed out, it has given our
age its most fitting name and is its most conspicuous feature. On
the other hand, we have the scientific concept of the whole material
universe as mechanism also. Electrons and atoms and molecules,
cells, tissues and organs, organisms themselves, all are studied ac-
cording to mechanistic concepts and looked upon as mechanistic
operations.
In the first case we know the history of the machines from the
very start, and know that they emerge in response to our purposes
and by virtue of our intelligence. In the second case we find the
mechanisms, or at least what we call mechanisms, in action; of their
origins we know nothing. Out of this ignorance perhaps as much
as from any other source has arisen the concept of God, at least so
far as the intellect is concerned ; the "argument from design" is still
the best of the logical "proofs" of the existence of a Divine Being.
So far as machines in the simple and original sense are con-
cerned, it is clear that man is the machinist and not the machine.
Homo Faber is a better definition of the species now than ever before.
The making first of tools and now of machines is perhaps the most
conspicuous expression and embodiment of man's purposive and
intelligent life. The very purposelessness of the materials out of
which machines are made offers the opportunity for the fullest plav
of the purposeiveness of man. Certainly from this angle of the
problem, all the logic tends to make purpose the essence of the
human factor involved : it would be a strange perversion to argue
the blindness and subjection of the machine back upon the maker
thereof.
Now no one would be so quick as the mechanist to deny that man
is a machine made, as man's own machines are made, by a higher
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being for that higher being's purposes. Yet if a mechanistic philos-
ophy is to rest upon a soUd basis of knowledge, it must have re-
course to the machines we know about, our own, and not to a
universe of mechanisms which is after all a postulate or rather only
a working hypothesis of science. Of course comparison of man to
a lawnmower or a gas engine is mere childishness: not even the
lowest organic creature can be closely compared with any such put-
together thing as these or any other machine. Nothing is more
essential to organic life than that it is not put together and cannot
be taken apart. Its organs are not mere parts, and cease to be what
they are when separated from the organism. It would be more
sensible to say that nothing in the material universe is more unlike
a machine than is an organism. And of all organisms man is the
least machine-like.
When we turn to the mechanisms, so-called, of the physicist and
the biologist, we admit freely that man's body is apparently on the
same general plane with the bodies of all other living creatures, and
is subject to the same general laws and principles of operation as
they. Flatly man is an animal : this is one of the main lights that
came from Darwin's work or rather which his work made available
for the mass of thinking people. If an animal is a mechanism, then
in the same sense, man is a mechanism: but this is mechanism in
a figurative, almost a poetic sense, far removed from the simple con-
cept of the lawnmower or eggbeater.
3. Is the World a Mechanism f
Here we meet again the easy conversion of a laboratory hy-
pothesis into a demonstrated proposition. It is surprising how many
intelligent people just assume that the world is a vast mechanical
contraption, like Huxley's imaginary clock, all wound up and going
its inexorable fore-ordained way. That the physico-chemical world
is just this is one of the commonest of assumptions; it is treated as
a basis of solid concrete upon which to build the most imposing
logical structures. Not only the mechanist but the anti-mechanist,
if he is to share in the indispensable boons of science, both practical
and speculative, must adopt the use of the hypothesis in enormous
ranges of his thinking. So this most admirable of intellectual de-
vices tends ceaselessly to become the most subtle enemy of a full
philosophical grasp of the problem of the World-All. It is a sort
of intellectual summa jus sumnia injuria.
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Yet the mechanistic character of the universe is totally un-
proven: it is at most a brilliantly successful working device and
an enticing and alluring speculation. Even in its genuine and true
role as working device, it seems to have flaws when pushed to
extreme and checked by the newest methods of precision and com-
putation,—methods so abstruse and complicated that only an expert
dare try to talk about them. How much havoc is the Heysenberg
principle of indetermination to work in the extreme refinements of
determinism? Will Millican's cosmic ray save the universe from
the antinomy of the law of entropy ?
Then there is the profound logical difficulty involved in the fact
that the so-called laws of science are always based on conditions
that never obtain in the concrete processes of the very nature they
purport to describe: the law of falling bodies is really a law accord-
ing to which no actual body ever falls; Newton's first law of motion
holds "except insofar as (the body) may be compelled by impressed
force to change that state ;" and it is evidence that the exception is
really the universal rule, so that the "law" is a useful tool of thought
and computation but useless as description of nature in any form.
It is a wholesome discipline for the mechanistically inclined mind
to consider the case of a profound mathematician and physicist,
Charles Pearce, who sums up his universe under the title "Love,
Chance, and Logic," and insists that contingency is integral to the
world of nature; he even coins the name tychism for his theory of
reality. Haldane, an expert in the stronghold of mechanism,—bio-
chemistry,—flatly declares that the mechanistic principle falls far
short of validity and efficacy.
Looked at in the full light of present-day science the universe
still refuses to submit tamely to the mechanistic shackles. Clear
from electrons and protons up through the hierarchy of being to
man, it eludes the logic of determinism and powerfully suggests
something far different. It is noteworthy that the physicist in a
struggle to portray the behavior of atoms is forced to use human-
istic, even sentimental terms, and say that the atomic family is
satisfied or dissatisfied according to the presence or lack of its
appropriate assemblage of infinitesimal members. Thus mechanism
traced to its furthest limits seems to consort with something not
mechanistic at all : logic refuses to decide whether mechanism or
sentiment is really prior; that is then left to personal preference,
and on that preference the thinking world splits.
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It is hard to avoid the feehng that the physics and biology of
today would be sounder in its larger implications and tendencies if
they took a page from their humble predecessors,
—
"natural philos-
ophy" and "natural history." We have come far from the time
when prevailing opinion agreed that "the undevout astronomer is
mad"; without wishing to go back and bolster up the theological
argument from the starry heavens, is it too much to wish that
modern science should look up occasionally from its engrossment
with microscopes and calculus? "Slore attention to the gross facts
of the world need not shut out any of the minutiae, and would be
likely to lessen the tendency toward mechanistic and deterministic
ipse dixits.
Let us turn natural philosophers or natural historians and look
at the cosmos in the large. It is full of two things,—movement and
variety : it is eternally going on. and that as though it had always
gone on and would always go on. But the largest of all frames into
which the mind of man has fitted it,—the frame of evolution,^
—
is essentially a going from somewhere to somewhere else. Two
significant formulas must be reckoned with, each the fruit of a great
mind,—creative evolution and emergent evolution ; whatever flaws
there may be in the particulars of the work of these two thinkers
the main thesis stands firm : and that thesis in no wise encourages any
extreme mechanistic theory of reality. To the two men who gave
us the formulas the sum of things is essentially non-mechanistic
:
to Bergson it is life, to Lloyd Morgan, it is spirit. In both cases
there is room for Pearce's "Love, Chance and Logic," and that is
more than can be said of a purely mechanistic theory.
The logic inherent in the once honored verse, "The undevout
astronomer is mad" is still as good as it ever was, only that it has
lost its specifically theological direction ; it still points to elements
and components beyond the present scope of human understanding.
The vast swing of the infinite and the unwearied elusiveness of the
infinitesimal, and the endless play of variation, mutation, shades of
being, tmforeseen emergencies, the eternal new in the flux of time,
all tend to throw doubt upon a mechanistic metaphysics. We have
no coercive proof on either side, only more or less vague indications
and suggestions, and these abundantly present on both sides ; we can
only conclude that categorical assertion on either side would be
dogmatic and presumptuous. In all this I refer to the so-called
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material or non-human universe ; for we must now turn to Man
himself,—that is ourselves.
To the question "What is man" the first and most authoritative
answer for each of us is "I am Man." I must follow the counsel of
Socrates and Fichte and examine myself. Here is the source of
all concepts and the significance of all terms. Vital as is the labora-
tory it can tell me nothing about my own essential being which con-
tradicts my own immediate experience of that being. Obnoxious
as this may sound to some ears, it is really a logical truism, for
objective science when true to itself repudiates any contact with the
inner data here referred to : the rigorous behaviorist would agree
logically, indeed extremely, for he would declare that those inner
data are nil and non-existent ; and that science has no concern with
such non-entity. In all of which he is right and wrong, as usual.
5. What Am I?
I, myself, am eternally the "base of all metaphysics" ; the Alpha
at least ; whether or not the Omega also is a distant question. Here
the mystics are sound and safe, and speculative thought today needs
nothing so much as to listen to their voice. To drink of the doctrine
of the pure spirit without being drunken is perhaps the supreme
test of the metaphysician : if Emerson had written a system instead
of aphorisms he might have surpassed all the rest in this achieve-
ment ; in poetry Walt Whitman has actually done it.
I, myself, to myself, am "less donnees immediates de conscience."
These aboriginal gifts of experience are absolute and indefeasible:
scepticism toward them is mere perversity, a form of pseudo-
knowledge poised upon nothing thumbing its nose at both sound
philosophy and ordinary common sense. What I am, see, hear,
feel, in any and every way experience,—all this is just what it is and
brooks no refutation, for the simple reason that nothing in the uni-
verse has any competence to refute it. These are Dewey's "being
and havings," prior to and determinative of all knowledge. To prag-
matism they are indeed not knowledge at all ; but still they are more
certain than any knowledge. It would be as valid terminology to
say that they are knowledge par excellence, except perhaps for the
advantage of saving the term knowledge for the great operative
region of language and reasoning which is built by life and specula-
tion upon or out of the basic gifts of the experience of the Ego.
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Yet all this is sadly out of fashion in these latter days, and not
without cause even if not thoroughly reasonable. So often philos-
ophy has looked at the within and become enamored of it, and so
lapsed from the clear-cut processes demanded by speculation into
mere mystic adoration. And at the same time the physical sciences
have made such a grand success by ignoring and forgetting their
own mother-lode of primary personal experience, that the philos-
ophers have run after them and so abandoned all hope of any
philosophy. One must admit that something more than nine-tenths
of all intelligent people would turn gladly from Fichte or Hegel or
Bradley to Darwin and Huxley and Faraday and the host of their
modern followers.
Nevertheless, "though fiends and all things ill should wear the
brows of grace, yet grace must still look so ;" no matter how badly
the Ego-philosophers have erred, the Ego is still the starting point
for both life and thought: no matter where we want to go we must
start from where we are: and where I am is in myself. So we may
as well brave the lifted eyebrows of the arbiters of intellectual
fashion, and proclaim the doctrine of the Self as "the beginning of
wisdom" in speculative thought.
William James discussing Kant's categories suddenly blurted out
in one of those inimitable sallies of his, "Of course we know we
have no such clanking machinery inside us. "What could be a more
natural utterance for the brilliant mind which first taught the world
to think clearly and vividly of "the stream of thought?" His Prin-
cipales of Psychology" is full from beginning to end of the sort of
true description of the life of the Self which we are now seeking.
Most vital of all is his insistence upon the totality and unity of the
primary form of experience : "After discrimination, association,"
is the formula. His description of the infant's life as a "buzzing,
blooming confusion" may suffer from his fondness for the pic-
turesque, but it is eloquent of his sense of the unity and continuity
of experience at its start.
But the adult mind does not lose this primitive unity and con-
tinuity, as one might be tempted to suppose ; it does gain an ever
increasing manifoldness and variegation; it gradually acquires a
whole world of details and systenis, but the infinite manifold is
still bound up and integrated in an unbroken unity and coherence.
Above all does experience refuse ever to reveal fragments, disjecta
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membra, bits joined together; always fluency, totality, connected-
ness ; there is always a way to travel from any point in the whole
to any other part with coherence at every transition. This is per-
sonality: or more strictly it is this experienced unity of one's own
experience, plus the postulate of other selves, that yields the concept
of personality as inhering in ourselves and other beings outwardly
similar to us.
It may be noted in passing that this concept of a practically in-
finite number of persons, each with its own world, no tw^o of the
worlds being supposably identical, is at the same time near-incon-
ceivable and inescapable. Solipsism if feasible at all would be a
happy escape from such a gigantic demand upon the mind. But
of all the many solutions of the world-riddle that are logically pos-
sible, but practically objectionable, solipsism is doubtless the most
hopelessly absurd.
Now if any two things in the whole range of our conception are
diametrically different, this "I" and a machine or mechanism are.
The machine is put together of parts, each part having an entity and
possible existence of its own. In the machine proper,—the only
mechanism of which we have any competent knowledge,—the parts
exist prior to the machine and can survive it,—as every second-hand
Ford dealer well knows. But in the "I," the whole exists first, and
the "parts,"—we should have another name, such as phases or
moments,—arise in and through the whole, never having any entity
of their own, either before, during, or after the whole.
The pattern of mechanism is one of discontinuity and incidental
contact and interaction ; the pattern of the I is fluent, coherent, and
genetically rather than incidentally interacting. The notable facts of
sleep, and other forms of unconsciousness and of death so far as
we know anything about death, not only do not mitigate this con-
trast, but increase it, for they are all processes totally be_\'ond the
range of behavior or machine or mechanism. To point out that so-
called living mechanisms parallel these strange interludes or cessa-
tions is again to bring into relief the gap between mechanism in its
true sense and even the lower forms of non-mechanistic existence.
But, it may be said, all this unity and coherence, this fluenc}- and
total entity, may be mere illusion, and if only seen clearly and
acutely enough, would turn out to be mechanism, with parts too
small to be perceived by our powers. This is a very triumph of
20 THE OPEN COURT
infantilism in intellectual high places: it is of a piece with "why
the sea is boiling hot and whether pigs have wings." True, it can
be said with words : and true also there is no coercive logic to oppose
to it ; all of which may be said of solipsism. The only bar to it is a
practical one, just as is the case with solipsism: if we suppose these
primary experiences to be illusion, then down comes every conceiv-
able form of reliable knowledge: the mystic dictum is fulfilled and
"All is Maya or illusion." Solipsism is 'far better than this doctrine
of illusion, for solipsism does give us a coherent and understandable
picture of a universe, and a simple and logically charming one, even
if it is practically outrageous and abhorrent ; the doctrine of illusion
annihilates all firm and livable reality and plunges us logically into
a waste of mist and ignorance.
There are then two senses in which we may understand anyone
who declares that man is a mechanism : first, that he is essentially like
one of his own machines, and this is so absurd that the mechanist
himself repudiates it with all vigor. Second, that man is like natural
mechanisms, and that necessarily in a figurative or symbolical sense,
and this is quite harmless and poetic, unless and until accompanied
by adequate specifications. In any case neither form of the mechan-
istic proposition in the least degree invalidates my direct and
authentic sense of the fluent, coherent, unified and purposive nature
of my own existence. Practically this means the continued function
of the moral life and of ethics as part of philosophy.
